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IN THE SUPRD1E COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

COMMON CAUSE OF UTAH, an
unincorporated association
by t1ARJOR IE J. THDriAS, on
behalf of its members and
tlARJOR IE J. THQr.1AS, an
individual,
Respondents-Plaintiffs,

-vUTAH PUBLIC SERVICE CDr1t~IS
SION and MILLY 0. BERNARD,
OLOF E. ZUNDEL, and KENNETH RIGTRUP, in their
capacities as Commissioners
of the UTAH PUBLIC SERVICE
COMMISSION, real parties in
interest,

CASE NO. l 5685

Appellants-Defendants,
MOUNTAIN FUEL SUPPLY
C01·1PANY , intervenor.

APPELLANTS' BRIEF

NATURE OF CASE
This is an appeal by defendants' (hereinafte;- appellants)
from an Order of the Third Judicial District Court, The Honorable
Peter F. Leary, District Judge, granting respondents' ~1otion for Summary Judgment on all issues and denying appellants' Motion for Summary
J11dgment in accordance with the orders and memoranda of the Court filed
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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on January 4, 1978, and January 5, 1978, and judo:,,ent entered in
favor of respondents and against appellant·:,, dated January 23, 1978,
declaring the Utah Public Service Commission to be subject to the Open
and Public

~1eeti ngs'

Act, Utah Code Annotated, Section 52-4- l ,

~-,

when said Commission deliberates, votes upon, establishes, or otherwise
evaluates existing or proposed public utility rates, tolls and charges,
rentals or classifications.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellants seek reversal of the Order of the Third Judicial
District Court and a declaration of this Court that the Utah Public Service Cor:linissim·, is

!1~~

-;,,'!

required to deliberate, vote upon, establish or
proposed public utility rates, tolls, charges,

J!'

rentals or classifications in open public meetings, pursuant to Utah Code
Annotated, Section 52-4-l,

~-

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The parties hereto have stipulated to the following facts which
were taken as true for the purposes of the lower court's action:
l.

Appellant Public Service Commission admitted that
the Legislature has the power and authority to
set and determine utility rates, and that such power
and authority have been delegated to the Utah Public
Service Commission.

2.

Appellant Public Service Commission admitted that it
is a "public body" ~1hich conducts "meetings" as those
terms are defined in the Open and Public Meetings' Act.
Section 52-4-l, ~-

3.

Appellant Public Service Commission admitted that respondents and the general public are excluded from those
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meetings of the Public Service Commission, wherein
the commissioners deliberate and vote upon the sett!ng oF rates b~t deny that respondents or the publlc have any r1ght to attend such meetings.
4.

Appellant Public Service Commission asserted that any
requirement that the Commission deliberate and vote
upon the setting of rates in public is unconstitutional
and a violation of the due process provision of the 14th
Amendment of the Constitution of the United States and
Article I, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution.

5.

That if the respondents, or either of them, requested
permission from the Commission, or any of the Commissioners
thereof, to attend any of the deliberative sessions described in paragraph (3) above, such request would be
denied.

6.

The parties stipulated that the exemptions to the requirements of the Open and Public Meetings' Act contained in
Section 52-4-5, Utah Code Annotated (1953), as amended,
are not in issue in this action.

Respondents seek only to establish that the Utah Open and Public
Meetings' Act applies to the Public Service Commission "only when that
body is establishing utility rates."

TR-200 (p.24)

The Lower Court re-

ceived a copy of the Commission's Rules of Practice and Procedure which
contain references to the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and also the Utah
Rules of Evidence. (P.62) (TR-238)
Appellant Public Service Commission regularly conducts proceedings
upon written applications of various parties, usually utilities, to establish rates and classifications.

The proceedings are judicial in nature,

in that the parties are represented by legal counsel in an adversary setting.

Opening statements are made regarding the law and facts.

Conflic-

ting testimony of experts sworn under oath and exhibits are presented, pursuant to Commission rules and the Utah Rules of Evidence and Civil Procedure.
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The testimony is usually subjected to cross-examination by the opposing legijl counsel.

Legal counsel may and usually do make legal objec-

tions to testimony and motions 1·1hich must be ruled upon by appellants.
After the presentation of the evidence, the opposing counsel make
final summations of the law and facts, and the matter is submitted

to appellants for deliberation and their decision.

Findings of facts

and conclusions of law, together with an order, are issued which are
appealable on the record to the Utah Supreme Court.
The lower court ruled in effect that appellants must deliberate openly in public during the time they are called upon to v1ei9h the
evidence and conflicting testimony to render a decision and order.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE PROPERTY RIGHT OF THE CITIZENS OF THE STATE OF
UTAH ARE IMPAIRED IF THE QUALITY OF THE DECISION BY
THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION IS COMPROMISED BY
ABANDONING THE ANCIENT PROCESS OF CLOSED JUDICIAL
DELIBERATIONS AND DECISION-MAKING.
The Open and Public

r~eetings'

Act (also known as the "Sunshine

Law"), Utah Code Annotated, Section 52-4-1 (1953),

~.

provides gen-

erally that every meeting be open to the public unless closed pursuant to
statute.

The Public Service Commission is not directly referred to by sai

statute but only as its general terms may apply to any State agency or po·
ical subdivision.
The Public Service Commission is charged with the regulation of
all public utilities operating in the State of Utah.

Chapter 7 of Title

54 governs hearings, practice and pi'Ocedure before the Commission.
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Provi·

sian is made for complaints to be filed against public utilities as well

as complaints to be filed by public utilities against other parties.
Appellant Public Service
rate structures.

Co~mission

also receives applications for

In hearings before the Commission on such complaints

and applications, evidence is received and a decision is reached by
the Commission on both the facts presented and the applicable Utah
la1~.

(Utah Code Annotated, Section 54-7-9, 10, 11, 12 and 14.)

The

rights of the parties to these hearings are adjudicated and become final
(Utah Code Annotated, Section 54-7-14) subject only to review by the
Utah Supreme Court.

(Utah Code Annotated, Section 54-7-16)

The Com-

mission conducts all its meetings and hearings in open, which the
news media and the general public at large may observe.

The hearings

are conducted in an adversary setting with opposing legal counsel representing the various parties in interest.

After the Commission has re-

ceived the legal arguments, the sworn testimony and the exhibits and
evidence, pursuant to the Commission's rules and the Utah Rules of Evidence, the Commission then retires to its chambers to deliberate the proceedings.

During the deliberation, the Commission must weigh the evidence

and determine the credibility of

~litnesses

in establishing usually contro-

verted facts 11hich v10uld justify an increase in a rate structure or
justify a complaint 1vell taken against a party.

It is only the "delibera-

tions" of the Commission being conducted in an open meeting in issue in
the instant case.
Utah Code Annotated, Section 13-1-1.3 (1953), provides, in
part:

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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"The public service commission as established by
54-l-l, is continued in existence with the department
of business regulation. The public service commission
shall not exercise administrative authority over the
division of public utilities or over any other division
within the department of business regulation; . . . . The
public service commission shall not be subject to the
jurisdiction of the executive director of business regulation in regard to the exercise of its quasi-judicial
or rule-making functions within the department, except
that the executive director of business regulation if he
is also a member of the public service commission shall
participate in deliberations and decisions of the public
service commission as may any other member. The public
service commission shall exercise all quasi-judicial
and rule-making powers in regard to public utilities as
provided in Title 54 .... " (Emphasis added.)
The Supreme Court of the United States has held that judicial
powers may be conferred upon an administrative agency.

(See Sunshine

Anthrecite :oal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381, 60 S.Ct. 907, 84 L.Ed. 1263
(1940 1 , ;,"cu,::.cruction Finance Corp. v. Bankers Trust, 318 U.S. 163, 63 S
Ct. 515, 87 L.Ed. 680 (1943) ).
It could not be any clearer that the Legislature intended that
the Public Service Commission exercise functions that are quasi-judicial
in nature and independent of the executive administrative authority of H
Department of Business Regulation.

It is, therefore, submitted that the

specific wording of Utcth Code Annotated, Section 13-1-1.3 (1953), takes
precedence, although earlier in point of time over the general language
the Open and Public Meetings' Act, in particular, Utah Code Annotated,
tion 52-4-3 (1953).

!~elden

c

~

v. Clark, 20 U. 382, 59 P. 524 (1899); Pacif

Intermountain Express Co. v. State Tax

Co~.,

7 U.2d 15; 316 P.2d 549 (lr
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There is no real difference in the deliberations of the Public Service Commission than that of a jury or multi-judge court.

Facts

must be found by weighing evidence and examining exhibits, and the
law must be applied to the facts as found.

It cannot be presumed

that the Legislature intended to include the judicial or quasi-judicial
functions within the scope of Utah Code Annotated, Section 52-4-2 (2),
since it repealed none of the pertinent sections of Title 54 and did
not extend the application of the Open Meetings' Act to courts and judicial functions.

Had it done so there would be a serious constitutional

question raised as to an unlawful intermeddling by the Legislature into
the judicial

po1~ers

vested in the courts.

The Utah Constitution, Art.

I, Section 24, provides that all laws of a general nature shall have
uniform operation.
It is a common rule of law that the Legislature cannot delegate
essential legislative functions.

While it might be said that the Public

Service Commission in setting utility rates and adjudicating rights of
parties may be performing a legislative function,

said function is

either a ''nonessential" legislative function or is being performed in violation of Article IV, Section l, which vests the legislative powers of the
State in the Senate and House of Representatives and the people.

(See,

generally, Lloyd A. Fry Co. v. Utah Air Conservation Commission, 545 P.2d
495.)

Accepting for purposes of argument that the essential nature of
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the rate-making function of the CoMnission is quasi-legislative in
substance, it certainly is clear that it performs the major rortion
of that function through quasi-judicial procedures, rather than
quasi-legislative procedures.

It is significant that no action of

the Legislature is appealable directly to the Supreme Court on the
record as is the decision of the Public Service Commission in adjudicatingrates and classifications.

The Open and Public Meetings' statute

deals with "procedural" rather than substantive law.

Hence, the crucial

determination is whether the procedural requirements of the Sunshine
law may be applied to proceedings which are essentially judicial in
nature.
The Arizona Supreme Court decided a similar issue involving
the con

.e•c 0f e~~tcising

quasi-judicial power in the case of Arizona

Press Club, Inc. v. Arizona Board of Tax Appeals, Div. 1, 113 Ariz. 545,
558 P.2d 697 (1976).

In that case, the Arizona Press Club and Common

Cause alleged that a three-member tax appeals commission was subject in
their deliberations to the Open Meetings' Act.

In holding that the Board

of Tax Commissioners were not subject to the Act, the Court stated:
"l.!1en an administrative agency is exercising its
quasi-judicial power, it does not necessarily follow
that it acts quasi-judicially. It either acts judicially or it acts administratively. The procedures
prescribed by the statute and followed by the board
of tax appeals in hearing the parties in open forum,
taking the matter under advisement, deliberating,
writing a written decision and making that decision
available to the parties and the public, follow the
classic procedures of an appellate court in making a
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judicial decision. We believe that this is a 'judicial proceeding' vii thin the meaning of the statute."
The realistic, pragmatic reasons for exempting the Public Service
Commission from the operation of the Act are that it would be impossible for a commissioner within the context of his open deliberations to voice to the other commissioners that he did not believe
one witness in deference to another witness.

Likewise, it would be

difficult to admit that a commissioner in fact did not understand a
significant phase of the proceeding, such as the application of depreciation rules or capitalization concepts to a rate structure.

The

free exchange of information between commissioners in weighing the
rules of lavv applicable

1~ould

not exist if said commissioner knew that

he would be subject to political influence at the end of the term when
the question of his appointment to office was being considered.

In

general, the consumers and citizens of the State of Utah would suffer by
the undue influence that utilities could exercise over commissioners,
either through the political process or through constant refinement of
the adversary process directed towards any individual commissioners'
predispositions.
It is well settled that the constitutional guarantee of due
process of law applies to proceedings which are quasi-judicial in nature.
"The constitutional guaranty of due process of
law applies to, and must be observed in, a~ministra
tive as well as judicial proceedings, part1cularly

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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where such proceedings are specifically classified as judicial or quasi-judicial in nature ...
(Am. Jur. 2d Administrative Law, Section 351,
p. 163)
The Utah Supreme Court has also made this principle clear.
Salt Lake County v. Public Service Commission, 29 Utah 2d 386, 510 P.2d
923 (1973).

This Court has consistently held that Commission orders

will be set aside where fundamental due process rights have been violated.

Morris v. Public Service Commission, 7 Utah 2d 167, 321 P.2d

644 (1958).
As already indicated, the Commission acts as a decider of
fact and of law.
to that o'
inclur~.c.

The deliberation process of the Commission is identical

3,11 pe~it

'1'

jury.

It must

~leigh

evidence and this most assured!.

'''. n;,ination of the credibility of

1~itnesses.

Imagine the

headline if deliberations were open to the press:
"PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION BELIEVES UTILITY
PRES IDE I'll A BOLD-FACED LIAR."
But, of course, such a headline would never appear because, in the presence of the public, the commissioners would not engage in an open, full
discussion on the credibility of 1·1itnesses.
Revie1~, 1199,

points out some of the other problems involved in opening

such deliberations to the public.
(l)

An article at 75 Harvard La11

Among them are:

Officials are often reluctant to request informatiJn at public meetings lest they create
a public image of ignorance. The chief
editorial writer of the Chicaao Sun-Times
explained it this v1ay:

--

------
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It is not so much an unwillingness to
express public views that accounts for the
desire for secrecy as it is the need to cover
up just plain ignorance that so many public officials have. That is the basis for one argument
for secret meetings that might have some validity
In a secret meeting a public official can
honestly confess ignorance of a subject and seek
enlightenment from his fellow committee members and
witnesses. He would not be able to bring himself
to do this in a public meeting and such reluctance might have an adverse effect on the proceedings." (Letter to the Harvard Law Revie1~,
Nov. 28, 1961.)
(2)

Public officials are prone to waste time making
speeches for the benefit of an audience. This
could easily arise in the Public Service Commission context as commissioners would be inclined
to attempt to justify positions they perceived as
unpopular.

(3)

An official hesitates to abandon a view that he has
pub 1 i c ly advocated. Once a commissioner takes a
stand in open deliberations on a particular issue,
it is just plain human nature to cling to that position, even if the commissioner is later convinced
that he or she was wrong initially.

(4)

The press tends toward "sensational" reporting. All
too frequently newspaper stories are distorted by
the bias of the reporter or his paper. It is not
inconceivable that extensive coverage of this type
could give rise to the Commission bm~ing to intense
public pressure--pressure generated by a misinformed
or misled public.

Other problems associated with open deliberations were discussed
by the 4-to-l majority of the Arizona Supreme Court in Arizona Press Club
v. Board of Tax Appeals, supra.

As previously noted, this case involved
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a fact situation almost identical to the case at bar.

The Court

said:
"l·ie do not believe that the legislature intended to exempt only court 'judicial proceedings'
and not administrative agency 'judicial proceedings.'
To allow the public to attend the deliberations leading to a decision and to watch the writing of that decision would not, we believe, promote the ends of justice. We agree with the dissent of Justice Dekle in the
case of Canney v. Board of Publ. Instruction of Alachua Cty., 278 So.2d 260 (Fla.l973), when he stated:
' ... Those rights of persons and property involved in a hearing should be preserved in a judicial atmosphere which is essential to a fair and impartial deliberation
upon the rights involved. To afford less in
such a judicial type of proceeding 1·1ould be a
deniol of due process and of a fair hearing in
whic~ a person's rights and interests are at
5t~ke. as much as if he were before a judicial
~~;bunal.
We might as well return to the Roman
A•·ena for a 'thumbs up or thumbs dovm' resu 1t
by the public clamor if we are to eliminate the
judicial protections and safeguards in matters of
this kind.

* * *
'The result of depriving an administrative
body of free deliberation among themselves, just
as a regular judicial body or jury may do, is to
shut off the free flow of discussion among them
and an exch~nqe of ideas and an open discussion of
diFferin:J vie•,;s to the end that a fair and just result may be reached by the body based upon the evidence and arguments at the hearing. Ask any juror.
The answer 11ill be that the free interchange and
discussion among the group is essential to a fair
and just conclusion of the interests before them
for decision. This is not the area in which one
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need fear the alleged 'private deals' and extraneous considerations to the matter at hand,
so that really the asserted reason undergirdin~
the sunshine law is not present in a judicial
deliberation of a matter before an administrative board for a review of judicial character.
The basic concept of the 'right of the public to
know' is fulfilled upon reaching such a fair and
just result which is then publicly conveyed.'"
278 So.2d at 264-265.
The

\~yoming

Supreme Court agrees v!ith these principles.

In

School District No. 9, in County of Fremont v. District Boundary Board
in and for Fremont County, 351 P.2d 106, the Court considered the claim
that a zoning and boundary board should be required to deliberate in pub. lie.

The Court stated:
"HO\vever, the very nature of the activities of
quasi-judicial meetings be open to interested persons;
and it has been held that even where there is no statutory requirement for notice of the proposed action in
changing a school boundary reasonable notice is required
to be afforded to interested persons.
(Citations omitted.)
"The right of the public to be aware that the hearings of such boards will take place and to present evidence before them should not prohibit such boards from
having private sessions for planning or deliberations."
(l_g_. at 110.)
It is important to note that respondents' claim for relief is based

entirely on the Utah Open

r~eeting

Act.

They claim no constitutional nor

common-law right to attend Commission deliberations.

Appellants have shown

that parties before the Commission enjoy the constitutionally quaranteed
right of due process of law.

Appellants have also shown that an opening

of the Commission's deliberations would surely give rise to claims of due
process violations

by

such parties.

Appellants, therefore, respectfully
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submit that the right to due process of law guaranteed by Art. I,
Section 7 of the Utah Constitution, and the 14th Amendment of the
U.S. Constitution, precludes deliberations of the Commission from
being open to the public.

The Commission should not be required to

compromise the quality and integrity of its decisions by discussing
and deciding the matters in open public spectacles.
POINT II
SECTION 54-3-21 (4), UTAH CODE ANNOTATED (1953),
VESTS ABSOLUTE DISCRETION IN THE COMMISSION TO
DETERMINE WHEN INFORMATION MAY BE WITHHELD FROM
THE PUBLIC.
Section 54-3-21 (4), Utah Code Annotated (1953), provides:

* * *
Hearings or proceedings of the commisany commissioner shall be open to the
.. , il'lu all records of all hearings or proceedings or orders, rules or investigations by the commission or any commissioner shall be at all times
open to the public; provided, that any information
furnished the commission by a public utility or by
any officer, agent or employee of any public utility
may be withheld from the public whenever and during
such tin1e as the commission may determine that it is
for the best interests of the public to withhold such
information. Any officer or employee of the commission
who in violation of the provisions of this subsection
divulges any such i nforma ti on is guilty of a mi sdemeanor."
''!":;

. ·nc

,r

~f

It is interesting to note that this provision, the violation of
which is a crime, was not repealed when the Legislature passed the Open
Meetings Act.

It is also interesting to note that the Commission could

invoke this statute whenever it pleased in order to close any of its
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deliberations.

It could simply state that it was going to discuss

the type of information specified by the statute, and that it had determined that the public interest would be served by closing the meeting.

Inasmuch as the Legislature did not expressly repeal this pro-

vision, the Open Meeting Act must be construed to effectuate its operation consistent with the previous legislation.

(Sands, Sutherland's

Statutory Construction, Sec. 23. 10, p. 231.)
Resrondents might argue that Section 54-3-21 (4) was impliedly
repealed vii th the passage of the Open Meetings Act.

Such an argument

would clearly be untenable.
"Interpretation of statutes with regard to
the question 1·1hether they effect repeal of prior
law by implication is conditioned by a judicially
formulated and imposed assumption, or presumption,
against change in the legal order. Court reports
abound in decisions reflecting and endorsing a presumption against repeal by implication."
(Sands, Sutherland's Statutory Construction, Sec.
23. 10, p. 230, and a plethora of case cited thereunder.)
73 Am.Jur. 2d, Statutes, Sections 396 and 397 provides:
"Repeals by implication are not favored. T~us,
an intent to repeal by implication, to be effect1ve,
must appear clearly, manifestly, and with cogent f~rce.
The implication of a repeal, in order to be operat1ve,
must be necessary, or necessarily follm·l from t~e language
used because the first or dominant statute adm1ts of no
othe~ reasonable construction. Moreover, if two constructions are possible, that one will be adopted which_operates
to support the earlier act, rather than to repeal 1t by
implication.
"The courts will not presume that the legislature
intended a repeal by implication. Indeed, the presumption is always against the intention to repeal where express
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terms are not used, and where effect can reasonably
be given to both statutes. The presumption rests on the
improbability of a change of intention, or, if such
change occurred, on the probability that the legislature
would have expressed it with an express repeal of the
first." (Footnotes omitted.)
The Legislature provided the Commission with a vehicle by
which it could keep information secret.

That vehicle has not been re-

pealed, either expressly or impliedly.
POINT III
DECISIONS OF OTHER JURISDICTIONS SUPPORT APPELLANTS'
POSITION THAT THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION IS EXEMPT
FROM THE OPEN AND PUBLIC MEETINGS' ACT DURING ITS JUDICIAL "DELIBERATIONS."
There appear to be many cases across the country reaching oppo·
site CO!':':,cio:ls CJn the applicability of the Open l•ieetings' Act in genera
to

co:.,,•oS:t.'llo

v1hich exercise highly visible judicial functions, such as

appellant Public Service

Con~ission.

Appellants submit that the better-

reasoned position is that the Public Service Commission, in following

j~

cial procedures and exercising a judicial function which the Legislature
would be required to do itself if it were setting rates, is exempt from
the operation of the Open and Public Meetings' Act in order to preserve·
integrity of the jujicial process:
In Canney v. Board of Public Instruction of Alachua County, (I
278 So. 2d 260, three justices dissented from the four-judge majority, he
ing that even though the school board v1as acting in a "quasi-judicial"

c

city in deciding \'lhether a student's suspension should be continued, thE
board was a part of the legislative branch of C'JOVern,nent and the "Sunsh'
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La1'1'' was violated 1-1hen the board recessed the hearing to reach a decision.

The majority concluded that as a general rule administrative

agencies have no general judicial powers, notwithstanding they may perform some quasi-judicial duties, and, under the separation of powers doctrine,
the Legislature may not authorize officers or bodies to exercise powers
which are essentially judicial in their nature.

The Court stated that

the characterization of a decisional-making process by an administrative
board as "quasi-judicial" does not make the body into a judicial body, and
that the intent of the Legislature in passing the "Sunshine Law" was to
cover any gathering of some of the members of a public board where those
members discuss some matters on which foreseeable official action will be
taken by the board.
The dissent in Canney argued that "Lt_!he Legislature itself has
recognized its grant of quasi-judicial powers to various boards and agencies as 'something apart' from those agencies' principal functions, and that
they are to be treated in a different manner."

278 So. 2d at 264.

The dis-

sent illustrated this point by noting that the Legislature adopted the Administrative Procedure Act,

~1hich

provided for the procedure regulating

the exercise of quasi-judicial power by the agencies (much like court rules).
The dissent stated that:
" ... It is apparent that such distinctive qua~i
judicial activity was never intended t? ~e.m~lded 1nto
an agency's regular duties and respons1b1l~t1~s and .
thereby treated in a 'nonjudicial' manner ~n 1ts cons~
deration. I believe that the Legislature 1s as consc1ous
as anyone in preserving private rights and due process of
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individuals who may come before a board or agency, and
that the Legislature intended to insure that those rights
were afforded in accordance with due process in a judicious manner, as reflected by adoption of the 1id1ninistrative Procedure Act for state agencies.
"The regular activities of an agency and those 1'1hich
are quasi-judicial are altogether different. Those rights
of persons and property involved in a hearing should be preserved in a judicial atmosphere which is essential to a
fair and impartial deliberation upon the rights involved.
To afford less in such a judicial type of proceeding would be
a denial of due process and of a fair hearing in which a person's rights and interests are at stake, as much as if he
were before a judicial tribunal ... "
278 So.2d at 264. (Dissent)
The dissent further stated that it is not necessary to have an express
exception in the "Sunshine Law," but that the quasi-judicial function
stands independently without having to be excepted anymore than courts,
as juJi'

-.~

1--

··:e'

need to be express exceptions to that lav1.

This is recognized as the judicial protection
basically afforded to all persons. The simple fact that
such quasi-judicial proceedings are not fully judicial
does not deprive them of their basic constitutional protections and safeguards to the individuals or properties involved in that type of proceeding. And it is fully judicial for the particular proceeding, insofar as the matter
involved is concerned."
278 So.2d at 265. (Dissent)
According to the dissent, it is unnecessary
" ... that adr~inistrative agencies beco,ne actual fulfledged judicial bodies in order to function in a judicial atmosphere. To hold otherwise diminishes the constitutional right to a judicial consideration by quasi-judicial bodies in matters fully as important as those which may
come before a full-fledged judiciary. They do not change
in their importance and protection by virtue of being heard
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by a body 1~hose regular duties are otherwise, when
that body convenes in a proceeding which is judicial
in nature. If this is not recognized it will destroy
the traditional quasi-judicial functions of enumerable
bodies and important agencies considering questions of
vital and far-reaching effect."
278 So. 2d at 265. (Dissent)
The dissent expressed the fear that the majority holding would invite
Federal intrusion in areas where the state would be neglecting the constitutional rights and privileges of those persons and property interests involved in quasi-judicial hearings or proceedings.

It 1·1as

also feared that the open exchange of views and a free flow of expression
mig:1t be cut off if the administrative body was deprived of free del iberation among its members.

It was contended that the free interchange and

discussion among the members are essential to a fair and just conclusion
of the interests before them for discussion.

The dissent concluded that:

" ... This is not the area in which one need fear the
alleged 'private deals' and extraneous considerations to
the matter at hand, so that really the asserted reason undergirding the sunshine law is not present in a judicial deliberation of a matter before an administrative board for a
review of judicial character. The basic concept of the 'right
of the public to know' is fulfilled upon reaching such a fair
and just result which is then publicly conveyed.
"The quasi-judicial function, wherever it is exercised,
is 'primarily' and indeed totally involved at that moment
by any such board, commission or agency. The quasi-judicial
board must therefore be allowed such independence as may be
necessary to meet the minimum criteria of due process. This
is my earlier and fundamental premise for all01~ing the ~re~
exchange in such bodies' deliberations on matters of a JUdlcial nature. Although such quasi-judicial boa~ds_are not a
part of the judicial branch of government, the1r 1ndependence
in making decisions must be preserved."
278 So.2d at 265. (Dissent)
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The Court in Jordan v. District of Columbia, (D.C. Ct. of
App., Aug. 3, 1976), 362 A.2d 114, specifically rejected the majority position in Canney, supra, and accepted the dissenting opinion.
A metropolitan police department's denial of an application for a
license to carry a concealed pistol 1~as affirmed by the board of appeals and reviewed at a nonpublic conference, of v1hich no transcript v1as
made.

The petitioner-applicant argued, in addition to other points,

that the board failed to comply with the "Sunshine Act."

The Court re-

jected the argument by stating that the statute pertains to all official actions of an executive or legislative nature, but does not apply
to adjudicatu~;-type ~earings.

The Court was not persuaded by Canney,

supri., i>1 ; -,.~, .· · tatu':e similar to the one in question was held to app:
to quasi-judicial as v1ell as quasi-legislative deliberations.

The Court

agreed with the Canney dissent and quoted at length from the minority
opinion.

The Court concluded by stating that:
"There can be no question that the case before us
for review was an agency adjudicatory proceeding, in
contradistinction to a legislative or quasi-legislative
action. Cf. Hotel Association v. District of Columbia
Minimum Wa e and Industrial Safet Board, D.C. A p.,
318 A.2d 294 1974 . As it is our considered opinion
that the deliberative process incident to final orders
in such proceedings is not covered by the so-called
'sunshine' amendment, it follows that the challenged
orders in this case are not defective either because the
Board members arrived at their decision at a nonpublic
conference or because no transcript of such conference was
made .... "
262 A.2d at 119.
The holding in Jordan, supra, on this point 1·1as follm·1ed and

cited as controlling in:

Bernstein v. District of Columbia Board of Zon
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Adjustment, (D.C. Ct. of App., July 13, 1977) 376 A.2d 816; Dupunt
Circle Citizens Assoc. v. D.C. Board of Zoning Adjustment, (D.C. Ct.
of App., 1976) 364 A.2d 610.
The Court in Dupont Circle Citizens Assoc., supra, reviewing
orders of the Board of Zoning Adjustment made in a closed executive
meeting allegedly in violation of the "Sunshine Act," followed Jordan,
supra, and said that:
"The quasi-judicial function of an administrative
agency differs completely from the nature of its other
activities. The personal and property rights of the
parties, at issue in such proceedings, can only be protected, under the American system, in a judicial atmosphere that assures freedom of expression to each deciding official and encourages a free discussion and exchange
of views which is so essential to frank and impartial deliberation.
"This court recently interpreted the Sunshine Act in
Jordan v. District of Columbia, D.C. App., 362 A.2d 114
(1976). We held there that to open all meetings to the pub1ic 1·10uld effectively prevent the frank exchange of views
in private among members of quasi-judicial agencies in reaching a decision--thus putting them on an entirely different
footing from appellate courts and juries--to say nothing of
federal administrative agencies--where experience has shown
that the free flow of discussion unimpeded by the presence or
reactions of the parties to the controversy has encouraged
fair and just results. 362 A.2d at 117.
"The Jordan decision is controlling as to the application
of the Sunshine Act."
364 A.Zd at 613,614.
The Court held that there was no violation of the "Sunshine Act" in that
the Act was not applicable to quasi-judicial functions of an administrative agency or board.
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The Court in Arizona Press Club, Inc., v. Arizona Board of
Tax AppcJls, Div.
r~embers

sent.

(1976), supra, also fully accepted the Canney dis-

of the Board of Tax Appeals had a procedure

~1hereby

they

heard the parties in open forum, took the matter under advisement, deliberated, wrote a decision, then made that decision available to parties
and the public.

The Court determined that the Board was invclved in a

"judicial proceeding" within the meaning of a statutory provision that
provisions of the open meeting law shall not apply to any judicial proceeding, and that the term "judicial proceeding"
administrc.tive itgency judicial proceedings.
v. Arizon<
that

J~

)~cte D~c:ntal

1~ithin

the Act includes

The Court, in quoting Batty

Board, 57 Ariz. 239, 112 P.2d 870 (191\1), stated

·,e agency may be said to have quasi-judicial power

in that it possesses both judicial and administrative powers.

It is im-

portant to note that Batty applied the Utah rule of administrative agencie!
exercising quasi-judicial functions.

The Court said that:

"\~e do not believe that the legislature intended to
exempt 011ly court 'judicial proceedings' and not administrative agency 'judicial proceedings.' To allow the public
to attend the deliberations leading to a decision and to
watch the writing of that decision would not, we believe,
promote the ends of justice. We agree with the dissent of
Justice Dekle in the case uf ca.mey v. 3oard of Publ. Instruction of Alachua Cty., 278 So.2d 260 (Fla. 1973) ...
558 P.2d at 699.

The Court held "that the exemption in the open meeting

la1~

as to judicial

proceedings applies to the Arizona Board of Tax Appeals when they are acting judicially, and that the open meeting law does not require the Arizona
Board of Tax Appeals to deliberate and make their decisions in public."
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-22-

The Oklahoma Supreme Court, in Stillwater Savings & Loan
Association v.

Oklahoma Savings and Loan Board (1975), 534 P.2d 9,

in reviewing a decision of the Oklahoma Savings and Loan Board made
in a meeting where the appellant was not present nor advised of, determined that the "Open Meeting Law" does not include hearings before
the Board when it acts in a quasi-judicial manner in an individual
proceeding.

The Court reasoned that there is no need for the "deci-

sion" to be reached in open session, and that the final decision, being
quasi-judicial action, is not required to be reached in an open meeting.
The concurring judge in State of Missouri ex rel. Phillip Transit Lines, Inc. v. Public Service Commission (1977), 552

S\~

2d 696, 703,

stated that:
I wish to expressly reserve the right to decide, when it is presented, the question whether the
Sunshine Law applies in situations where the Commission
is exercising a quasi-judicial function and constitutional
rights of privacy and due process are involved. See dissenting opinion of Dekle, Justice, in Canney v. Board of
Public Instruction of Alachua County, Florida, 278 So.2d
264 (Fla. 1978)."
The majority, without discussion, agreed with the Public Service Commission's
position in its brief that the Open Meetings Law applies to it.
Various Law Review articles have dealt with the issues before this
Court.

In addition to the Harvard Law Review article, cited, supra, 68

Northwestern Univ. Law Review 480, 1973, provides:
"Let the Sunshine
481-482

In~"

Douglas Q. Wickham

"We must concede, however, that there are limits to
'Government in the Sunshine,' especially in the early
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stages of working out a particular problem. It makes
a good deal of sense for any governmental body to ret~in a zone of privacy within which its members can air
internal disagreer11ents. A position, once publicly taken,
is not easily changed; and it seems undes i rab 1e to encourage
the adoption of 'first thoughts' by requiring that all collective governmental thinking be done in public. Few subordinates would feel free to offer constructive ideas for
fear of appearing to be in opposition to the eventual decision of the final authority. The value competing against
'a right to kn0\'1' then is not a 'right to secrecy,' but an
assurance of some insulation from the intense heat of public pressure. Pricrities must be determined, decisions
made, and program~ implemented. Absolute openness will detract from the overall public interest in informed and
rational governmental decisions."
CONCLUSION
It is L•ndeniable that the Commission perfor'ms functions which

are qu.1c,i-judicial in nature.
-, :h

The Open Heetings' Act, by its 0\vn terms,

Judicial and quasi-judicial functions.

Furthermore, case

law in other jurisdictions indicates that quasi-judicial bodies cannot
be compelled to open deliberations to the public.

It should also be noted

that the Harvard La\v Revie\v article cited above specifically recommends thr
quasi-judicial bodies be

exer~pted

from open meeting acts.

Exposure of Commission deliberations to the pressures of the public would sever,ely limit th" free flo•,1 of ideas and discussion essential
among deliberating commissioners and \vould compromise the quality of decisi•
to the detriment of citizens of Utah.

Such a 1 imitation may very we 11 give

rise to a denial of due process of law to the parties before the Commissior
It is of interest to note that the Founding Fathers conducted the deliberations leading to the Constitution of the United States in secret:
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The debates were secret, and fortunately
so, for criticism from without might have imperilled
... /the/ work ... so great were the difficulties encountered from the divergent sentiments and interests
of different parts of the country... . " I Bryce,
The American Commonwealth 24 (2d ed. 1908))
Finally, the Legislature has expressed an intention that the
Commission keep certain information secret, whenever the Commission deems
it in the public interest.
the Open 11eetings' Act.

This statute must be read consistently with

The District Court Ruling should be reversed.
Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT;B. HANSEN
Attorney General
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